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Introduction
In 2011, the recently established South Korean broadcasting network Channel-A launched Ije
mannareo gamnida (Now on My Way to Meet You), a program whose format brings together a group of
a dozen or more female talbukja (North Korean refugees)2 on a weekly basis. These women interact
with host Nam Hui-seok, an additional female co-host (or, in the earlier episodes, two), and a panel
composed of four male South Korean entertainers. Episodes typically open in a lighthearted manner,
with conversation about daily life in North Korea alongside mild flirtation between the Southern male
and Northern female participants, often involving song and dance, but climax with a talbuk seuteori, an
emotionally harrowing narrative from one of the border-crossers detailing her exodus from North Korea.
Via this framework Ije mannareo gamnida attempts to nurture the integration of North Korean refugees
into South Korean society; personalization of their plight occurs in conjunction with reminders of a
shared Korean identity maintained despite the regime they have fled, which is depicted as cruel,
repressive and backward. The show has proven a minor hit within South Korea and received coverage
from local and global media (see, e.g., Kim 2012; Choi 2012; Noce 2012).
The unusual subject matter of Ije mannareo gamnida itself renders the show worthy of analysis; equally
significantly, it offers a useful window into attempts to address South Korea’s increasingly diverse
society, which now includes a large number of North Koreans, as well as media practice in the face of
this demographic shift. Nevertheless, other than journalistic treatment, only a limited number of South
Korean scholars (e.g. Tae and Hwang 2012; Oh 2013) and Western academic bloggers (Draudt and
Gleason 2012) have thus far investigated the show and its larger social ramifications. In this paper, we
ask how Now on My Way to Meet You is to be understood within the contexts of South Korean society,
its evolving media culture, and developments in South Korean popular representations of North
Koreans. We offer close readings of segments from Ije mannareo gamnida in order to elicit motifs that
recur as it pursues its stated goal of humanizing North Korea for a South Korean audience and giving
defectors a voice amidst the general populace. Given that the show’s very title intimates that a genuine
encounter is about to take place, one might reasonably ask how successfully Ije mannareo gamnida
establishes a meeting point for South Koreans with these recent arrivals from North Korea: in other
words, does the show fulfill its stated aim of breaking down prejudices against North Korean refugees
and supplying them with a vehicle that allows self-expression?3 Or, alternatively, does it reinforce, even
if unintentionally, pre-existing regimes of knowledge and actually impede understanding of North Korea
and its people? As we will argue, given the broader sociopolitical context, the show’s desire to reinforce
elements of commonality between North and South while illuminating life in North Korea leads to a
double bind: viewers are encouraged to recognize homogeneity with the newcomers based on a shared
ethnic and cultural identity, even as the conversations and editing techniques applied to the material
often represent the Northern panelists as Others.
Now on Our Way to Ije Mannareo Gamnida
The debut of, and attention accorded to, Ije Mannareo
Gamnida, or Imangap, as it has come to be nicknamed,
rely on phenomena that have made the show
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Figure 1: “The longing of 61 years, the
dreams of 61 years...now on my way to meet
you.”
compelling to audiences now when its very appearance
could scarcely have been imagined even a decade ago.
Perhaps most importantly, the size and demographic
profile of the defector population within South Korea
has undergone significant change in recent years.
Stirred initially by the disastrous North Korean famine
of the 1990s, the number of talbukja arrivals grew
steadily to one to two thousand each year between
2002 and 2005, and then climbed to an annual level of
two to three thousand in the period between 2006 and
2010. This rapid growth has been accompanied by a
marked shift in the gender distribution of refugees.4
Although the majority of defectors were male up
through the end of the twentieth century, as the trickle
of those escaping from North Korea grew into a
steadier flow, more North Korean women began to cross into China (Lankov 2006). Most have stayed
in China or returned to North Korea, but many have travelled on to South Korea. As of 2013, there
exists a substantial community of roughly 25,000 talbukja in South Korea; among these, approximately
70% are female (Kim 2013).
This explosion in the number of North Koreans living in South Korea has coincided with significant
developments in governmental approaches to the North. The Sunshine Policy, under which South
Korea adopted a more open approach toward North Korea between 1998 and 2008, laid the
groundwork for new understandings of the North-South relationship and how this relationship might be
portrayed in popular culture (Kim 2007; Bevan 2010). Until then, Southern portraits of North Koreans
had been almost inevitably monochromatic, treating counterparts across the 38th Parallel as virulently
evil Communists or downtrodden, brainwashed automatons. From around the turn of the millennium,
though, such depictions began to encompass ever more multifaceted and sympathetic renderings of the
life worlds of North Koreans, most notably in the blockbusters Shiri (1999) and J.S.A.: Joint Security
Area (2000). As discussed by one of the co-authors for this journal (Epstein 2009a), frequently light-
hearted modes of presentation also surfaced, which included a number of B-movie comedies that
envisioned romances between Northern and Southern protagonists, such as the 2003 movie trio
Namnam bungnyeo (Love Impossible), Geunyeoreul moreumyeon gancheop (Spy Girl) and
Donghaemulgwa baekdusani (North Korean Guyz). The simultaneous appearance of these films,
though seemingly coincidental, clearly responded to an atmosphere of hopefulness about North-South
reconciliation after the 2000 summit meeting between former leaders Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il.
Ironically, however, another corollary effect of the warming at the state level was to move troubling
issues involving defectors out of policy discourse. Both the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun
administrations avoided shining too bright a light on the sufferings of incoming North Koreans out of a
concern that doing so might cause the North Korean government to protest strenuously and retreat from
engagement. Politically prominent defectors who might otherwise have acted as leaders of the fledgling
defector community, most notably former Workers’ Party International Secretary Hwang Jang-yop,
were restricted in their movements, partly for their own security.
In late 2007, however, the South Korean public voted in Lee Myung-bak and a far more conservative
administration. The subsequent shooting of a Southern civilian by a DPRK soldier at the Mt. Geumgang
tourist resort zone in summer 2008 then pushed the new government into an even harder stance against
North Korea than most had anticipated. North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, the March 2010
sinking of a ROK Navy vessel, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island that November, which brought
two civilian deaths, heightened skepticism throughout society about possibilities for rapprochement with
Pyongyang.
Moreover, such events have spurred a renewed focus on North Korean refugees and expedited the
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increasing influence of those working to raise awareness of their plight. This trend has led, for example,
to defector Cho Myung-chul, former director of the Institute for Unification Education, becoming a
lawmaker in the National Assembly. There he has found a like-minded colleague in Ha Tae-kyung, the
controversial founder of Open Radio for North Korea, a Seoul-based shortwave radio station that
broadcasts across the border on human rights and related issues. It also has meant that former espionage
agent Kim Hyeon-hui, imprisoned for the bombing of a Korean Air jet in 1987 but now rehabilitated
and highly critical of the North Korean regime, could appear in the media where once she was kept out
of the public eye. Meanwhile, the National Human Rights Commission began documenting abuses
suffered by North Koreans within the DPRK in a deliberate infringement of North Korean state
sovereignty.
A recent significant change in the structure of South Korea’s media has also played a critical role in the
arrival of Ije mannareo gamnida: a controversial bill passed under the Lee government in 2009 granted
permission for the first time to print media companies to operate television networks. Furthermore these
new comprehensive broadcasting channels (jonghap pyeonseong cheneol, or jongpyeon for short) have
extended operational powers that allow them to create educational and publically oriented programs to
be disseminated more broadly and thus make them more similar to large terrestrial networks than other
cable channels. The Kim and Roh administrations had maintained the state regulation of a previous era;
given the finances of the South Korean mediascape, the companies best positioned to take advantage of
any such modification would have been far from progressive. While consideration of the many issues
occasioned by this change and the bitter debate that they have aroused within Korea lie beyond the
scope of this paper (for more see T. Kim 2011), for our purposes it is important to note that the palette of
South Korean television now incorporates within its pigmentation such outlets as Channel-A, owned by
the conservative Dong-A Ilbo, and TV Chosun, affiliated via its parent company with the Chosun Ilbo,
widely recognized as the nation’s most notable right-wing daily. Both have maintained close
relationships with the Lee and Park administrations and strive to highlight North Korean refugee issues.5
Their activity contributes to a media environment in which criticism of North Korea is now less likely to
be blunted than it had been, but also more likely to convey the authenticity of first-hand reportage and
therefore frequently controversial.6
These developments have not gone unnoticed by the DPRK itself, which recently launched a scathing
attack in the Rodong Sinmun on South Korean media treatment of defectors, particularly females:
The south Korean puppet group is resorting to the smear campaign against the DPRK,
trumpeting about the "human rights record" in the north, Kang Kyong Suk noted, and went
on:
The group set up even a TV channel specializing in conducting an anti-DPRK smear
campaign, letting “defectors from the north” appear in programs.
It went the lengths of bringing together those “who were not defectors from the north” and
staging such burlesque as an art performance by a "group of beautiful girls, defectors from
the north," in the heart of Seoul as part of the smear campaign against the north. 7
This counteroffensive suggests a reframing of North Korea’s own representations of South Korea.
Where focus once centered upon South Korea’s sufferings under American imperialism, now defectors
in South Korea themselves are drawing attention, with their lives described for the North Korean
audience in a demeaning way that displaces the humiliations of capitalist society onto former DPRK
compatriots, with a forceful message that those who remain behind indeed have “nothing to envy.” This
evolving strategy offers indirect, but ample, proof that the barriers preventing information about the
outside world from entering the DPRK are becoming increasingly porous. The Dong-A Ilbo has
recently reported that a young elite North Korean woman studying in Beijing defected as a result of
watching Imangap. If verified, this claim would reaffirm the urgency of this reframing.8
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There appears little doubt as well that the lopsided demographics of the refugee community have driven
increasingly gendered depictions of talbukja in South Korean media and popular discourse, and
although there has been a recent spate of sympathetic fictionalized treatment of Northern male spies in
South Korean film (Jung 2013; Kwon 2013), actual border-crossers are now overwhelmingly
represented with a female face. While the Korean phrase “namnam bungnyeo” (lit. southern man,
northern woman) predates the division of the peninsula, the existence of this trope suggesting the most
desired origins for each member of a Korean couple has fostered an exoticization of Northern women,
who are often depicted as retaining a traditional, wholesome beauty lost by their Southern counterparts
(Epstein 2009a). Such female talbukja are subject to ambivalent responses in South Korea, however:
they may be denigrated as the recipients of a blinkered education in the North that has left them
ignorant, or patronized as trafficking victims during their transit through China, a characterization that
not only carries with it stigma but takes little account of the agency evinced by many in seeking to
improve their lives and those of their families via marriage brokers (Kim 2013; Ryang 2012).
Unsurprisingly, the ideological and cultural gulf that has arisen across the 38th Parallel over the course
of almost 70 years has meant estrangement and difficulties in adaptation for these border-crossers, both
in terms of their own abilities to cope with the new environment and the attitudes of the host society.
However, Imangap should not be understood through the inter-Korean lens alone, for the show also
reflects South Korea’s growing diversity. The number of foreigners living in Korea as of June 2013
topped 1.5 million, roughly 3% of the population.9 Of course, the process of integrating foreign
residents into South Korean society has not always been smooth. The government has devoted the
majority of its attention to female marriage migrants, whom it has strived to assimilate within the national
fabric. Nonetheless, many of these initiatives, though explicitly heralding a new era of multiculturalism
and aimed at ensuring proper access to South Korean social infrastructure, have featured a heavy-
handedness that attempts to convert incoming individuals into proper South Korean subjects, and has led
to efforts to, if not erase, then at least subordinate pre-existing non-South Korean identities (Lim 2009;
Watson 2010).
Media examples of such top-down responses have included shows like KBS’ Love in Asia, which
features the appearance of married couples in which one partner, almost invariably the wife, is foreign.
Typically, the members of the couple discuss their lives and are filmed in their homes, and a trip is made
back to visit the wife’s family in her country of origin. Images repeated from show to show reinforce a
narrow set of conceptions: that the husband hails from South Korea’s lower socioeconomic strata; that
the wife has come from an even poorer nation; that painful family separations are to be endured for the
chance of a better life in wealthy South Korea, where the wife works diligently to accommodate herself
to local mores; and that, for the most part, those in the family’s immediate orbit respond with displays of
the affectionate solicitude known in Korea as jeong to the new arrival. Though empathetic, such
treatment has also been criticized for being patronizing or ignoring the diversity among immigrants to
Korea (Jeong et al. 2011).  The recurrent themes suggest an effort on the part of government-sponsored
media to offer not only reassurance that the nation is being a welcoming host as its demography evolves
but also reminders that further education remains necessary in the face of reports that newcomers
encounter prejudice. One might readily argue that Imangap, whose production is openly supported by
the Ministry of Unification, stems from a similar desire to almost will into being the acceptance and
assimilation of North Koreans.
The Chatter of (North Korean) Beauties
The attention accorded to Now on My Way to Meet You derives, then, in part from its intersection with
current political and sociocultural trends. A crucial further factor, however, in the show’s ability to
garner an audience, especially locally, is its engagement with prevailing tastes in contemporary South
Korean television. As a yeneung (variety entertainment) program, it draws on an omnipresent talk-show
format, in which a group of several figures who are already, or are poised to become, familiar to viewers
gather with a host or two and occasionally an additional panel to laugh, joke and discuss.10 In this
regard, Imangap deliberately mimics KBS’ Minyeodeul-ui suda (Global Talk Show, more literally “The
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Figure 2: KBS’ Global Talk Show and its
North Korea-focused imitator Now on my
Way to Meet You.
Chatter of Beauties”), or Misuda, as it was commonly known, a popular program that aired between
2006 and 2010 and featured a group of young, female foreign residents discussing their lives in South
Korea in Korean, with a presenter and a panel of local males who ensured a flirtatious subtext. Several
of the women on the show appeared weekly, with some becoming regulars in domestic advertisements
and on South Korean television’s variety show circuit.
The influence of Misuda on Imangap is underscored not only in the prosody of their nicknames, but
also in the fact that the two share the same primary host, Nam Hui-seok, and that a Misuda panelist,
Bronwyn Mullen, acted initially as co-host on Imangap, although she was later dropped. The regular
praise that the talbukja guests on Imangap receive as endearing beauties (minyeo) further reinforces this
connection, as does the show’s subtitle, talbuk minyeodeul-ui hamkke-wa haneun isan gajok gamdong
peurojekteu, an exceedingly difficult phrase to translate idiomatically. (A literal rendering leads to the
tongue-twisting “Separated family emotion project together with Northern escapee beauties.”)11 Both
shows have frequent recourse to conversations about cultural difference, a fondness for quiz-like games
to pique audience interest and elicit information about such difference, and a studio arrangement in
which the presenters, female panelists and male panelists are seated separately around a central floor
area for performance.
The format of Ije mannareo gamnida thus operates
within a tested formula of chat with attractive women
who are intriguingly foreign but able to engage with
South Korean society. Personalities emerge with whom
viewers are encouraged to form an imagined affective
bond through regular contact. Each show’s popular
panelists refer upon occasion to their own Internet
“cafés,” a specifically Korean type of social media site
that allows interaction between celebrities and their
fans. Like Misuda, Imangap reflects the growing
prominence of young women within South Korea’s
societal fabric and its media-saturated consumer
capitalism that values youthful femininity as a commodity that can be converted into cultural content (Y.
Kim 2011).
However, one should not go too far in pushing the parallels between Misuda and Imangap: the northern
origins of the guests on the latter show inevitably lend it a serious undercurrent absent from its more
resolutely upbeat forerunner, whose immigrant panelists arrived in Korea under happier, entirely
voluntary circumstances, and whose occasional travails in Korean society as foreigners are offset (or
superseded) by special treatment accorded to celebrities in the making. While most commentators have
noted the salient links between Misuda and Imangap, fewer have noted another source of genetic
material for the latter show: KBS’ long-running Geu sarami bogo sipda (lit. “The Person I Miss”),
which relied on riveting narratives of anguish from those seeking to locate loved ones from whom they
had been separated and in the process opened remarkable windows of oral history onto South Korea’s
recent past. The already cited subtitle of Imangap, with its explicit pointer to divided families and
meetings after a long absence, suggests a clear connection to Geu sarami bogo sipda, which converted
painful personal narratives into grist for the collective understanding of South Korea’s frequently
traumatic development experience (cf. Tae and Hwang 2012).12
Geu sarami bogo sipda ran for several years, and as time passed the pool of those searching for family
members with whom they had lost contact shrank: the show made its way through the backlog of people
wanting to appear, and others presumably conducted their own successful searches as Korea became
highly digitized. An increasing percentage of those who made their way on to the show were
international adoptees, an evolution that encouraged a consciousness that the unhealed wounds of South
Korea’s past were progressively being played out beyond its borders. Likewise, other programs that
involved tearful tales of separation and reunion among Korea’s immigrant community, such as Love in
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Figure 3: Screenshot of “The Person I
Miss" (Geu sarami bogo sipda) featuring an
American adoptee seeking relatives in
Korea
Asia, Sadon cheoeum boepgesseumnida (Meet the In-Laws) and the “Asia! Asia!” segment on
Neukkimpyo (Exclamation Point), further fostered a sense that the nation had itself outgrown these
problems, become more prosperous, and was now standing in a hierarchical relationship to less
developed neighbors, toward whom viewers could feel a mixture of sympathy in remembering South
Korea’s own similar tales, and relief in an acknowledgment that the nation was moving on (Epstein
2009b).
Joint Insecurity Area
In order now to flesh out observations sketched above,
let us consider in detail characteristic segments of Ije
mannareo gamnida that demonstrate the show’s
strategies in representing North Korea and North
Koreans to a South Korean national public. In tracing
how the show moves from lighthearted opening to
more serious finale, we have chosen to focus first on a
close reading of Episode 45, broadcast in October
2012, not least because Channel-A has uploaded a
number of segments of this particular show on
YouTube and their availability will allow readers to
assess our interpretations independently.13
The episode starts in a conversation with the so-called
“S4,” the show’s quartet of featured Southern male
panelists, and the news that one of its regular members
will soon be marrying a woman seven years his junior.
This announcement leads to words of teasing
congratulation from one of the North Korean female panelists and well illustrates the show’s favored
opening tone of light banter that often features romance and matchmaking as a subtext.
This interchange continues with the introduction of
actor Kim San-ho, a handsome new male panelist. For
his debut on Ije mannareo gamnida, he performs
“Sandy” from the musical Grease, eventually crossing
the stage to serenade Shin Eun-ha, characterized on the
show as one of its two most notable minyeo. The
attention that Kim lavishes upon her provokes
embarrassment, though not displeasure; editorialized
subtitling reinforces the pseudo-romantic atmosphere
(“the moment Eun-ha falls in love” reads one caption as
Kim kneels by her side and sings).14 Embarrassment is an emotion that the show plays to, as do many
Korean entertainment programs (and social occasions in which icebreaking is desired), in an attempt to
create a sense of intimacy by breaking down barriers that arise from the stern maintenance of chemyeon
(face). Here the ploy takes on additional piquancy from the way that it attempts to break down
boundaries between North and South but also suggests that a shyness born of unfamiliarity and lifetimes
of preconceptions impedes freer interaction. The insistent recourse to the namnam bungnyeo trope is
difficult to ignore.
Remaining equally good-natured but shifting towards
quasi-burlesque, the spotlight moves to panelist Jo Se-
ho, a rotund comedian, who mimics the stretching
exercises performed by children on North Korean
television as they mobilize the DPRK in daily
calisthenics. Shin Eun-ha and her sister Shin Eun-hui,
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also a panelist on the show, join him. As they stretch, a
caption declares, “From Daehongdan potato to
rhythmic gymnastics challenge.” The allusion to
Daehongdan County in Ryanggang Province would
likely occasion a nod of ironic recognition from
talbukja viewers to whom the site is well known for a
visit from Kim Jong-il at the peak of the 1990s famine,
during which Kim declared that potatoes are equal to
rice, putting a cynically favorable spin on the desperate
need to substitute potatoes for the nation’s preferred
staple.15 Regular viewers of the program would also
recognize the reference, as two earlier episodes, numbers 32 and 41, had made digs at the sophistry of
regime rhetoric. The former, which came from North Korean television, displayed a young boy singing
an ode, in typically studied North Korean style, to the marvels of the Daehongdan potato (“Daehongdan
potatoes are so huge you can’t finish an entire one”), and, by extension, the pleasures of life under Kim
Jong-il.16 The latter had Jo reprise the boy’s performance in a routine where he too sings about the
remarkable tuber and provokes hearty laughter from all other participants on the show.17
Here in Episode 45, Jo tells us, in humorous self-
deprecation, that he rehearsed until 4 a.m. the previous
evening with the Shin sisters in order to be able to
produce the well-choreographed routine that we are to
witness. First, a clip is played of children performing
the stretching exercises in a park outside Mangyongdae
Schoolchildren’s Palace in Pyongyang, with a subtitle
that informs the audience that Kim Jong-il instituted the
exercise regimen in 1994. The program thus offers an
opportunity for deeper understanding of North Korean
society; however, delivery of this information is unlikely to register uppermost in viewers’ minds: Jo’s
incongruous imitation of the children’s shorts and knee-high socks turns the sequence into an
entertaining vignette that renders the North endearingly quaint. Furthermore, multiple cutaways to the
bare legs and lower body of Shin Eun-ha as they perform these calisthenics suggest that, above all, the
show’s producers simply recognized an opportunity to draw attention to the participants’ attractiveness
in a mildly titillating fashion.18
Such strategies exemplify how Episode 45 pursues the show’s stated goals of combating stereotypes and
allowing empowering forms of self-expression, but in ambivalent form. Similar ambiguities arise in the
following segment. The audience now meets Choe Geum-sil, a guest panelist who will later be featured
in the episode’s talbuk seuteori. Choe is treated as a celebrity, in that she recently won a regional heat of
a long-running amateur singing contest televised by KBS, “Jeon-guk norae jarang” (lit. “Nationwide
Song Pride”). Given that talbukja make up only a small, if noteworthy, fraction of the total population,
its successes usually summon the attention of both the South Korean and international media.19 A
natural performer, Choe introduces herself in the brashly confident manner that is de rigueur for Korean
TV competitions, albeit with the addition of Northern declamatory mannerisms, and then offers the
audience a brief rendition of the song that gained her first prize.
The yeneung program format urges singing, dancing,
and demonstrations of athleticism generally. Imangap
appears to favor such vignettes more than most,
however, not only because the North Korean education
system attempts to instill these skills in its people, but
because artistic display provides a relatively innocuous
method for allowing difference to shine through, while
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nonetheless encouraging feelings of warmth.20 Few
episodes go by without multiple songs, the majority of
which relate to either the glory of the Kim family
and/or a tenet of North Korean socialist morality. 21 In
this case, the traditional Korean style of the song that
Choe performs transcends the history of division in
reflecting the shared culture of North and South, but the
revelation that Choe honed her vocal and oratorical
prowess, of which she also gives a sample, as part of a
propaganda troupe in a North Korean military unit has
the opposite effect. The dissonance is further
emphasized by a caption stating that the overall effect actually resembles watching a North Korean
broadcast (“jeongmal bukhan bangsong boneun neukkim”). Drawing viewers closer and then pushing
them away in this manner exposes dilemmas at the show’s core: elements expressing shared traits or
heritage as Koreans are juxtaposed with those that highlight divergence.
The program then moves on to its regular segment of informative discussions of daily life in the North,
still enlivened with a sprinkling of humorous vignettes. In this episode the audience is treated to
discussion of the North Korean state food distribution system, and dialogue about items eaten in the
North generates further cognitive dissonance. All the Northern women acknowledge an unwelcome
familiarity with kangnaenggibap, a ubiquitous mix of corn and rice eaten as a rice substitute during hard
times. Not one of the South Korean cast, by contrast, has previously tried it. The host, Nam Hui-seok,
now parodies the presenter of another Channel-A TV show, Meokgeori X-Pail (“The Culinary X-
Files”), as northern food items are trotted out for a taste test. Upon sampling the uninspiring blend, Nam
states drolly, “It’s alright now, but after a year things would be a bit different.” The segment also carries
a discussion of differences between Southern and Northern varieties of kimchi, but dialogue, and ability
to offer insight, stalls at the absence of seasonings other than salt available to add flavor to the staple.
Nam utters a simple declaration upon tasting the dish: “Jjamnida” (“It’s salty.”).
The show continues its discussion of the DPRK’s state
distribution system with a focus on the mundane
products that people receive through it. Such discussion
segues into reminders of impoverished and difficult
lives. One of the most popular panelists, Kim Ara,
relates a story about waking up once in her North
Korean home with blood trickling on her face as a
result of nocturnal visitations of mice. Ominous
background music as she speaks builds mock-horror
film suspense, while cutaway shots to the disgusted
expressions of South Korean panelists underscore that the narrative is meant to be viscerally affecting
and alien to contemporary South Korean middle class experience, while those born in the North react
with nods of recognition. Despite an avowed desire to break down barriers, editorial intervention, then,
points up Otherness.
At this point, the show makes a transition toward discussion of food shortages in more serious fashion
and presents archival footage of the Gonan ui haenggun (“Arduous March”). Recapitulation of the
famine is introduced with a caption that speaks of the Arduous March as “the period in which North
Korea’s total distribution society collapsed.” Slowly, but insistently, the episode prepares for a heart-
rending climax as production techniques work to engage sympathy. As video clips recall the disastrous
floods and droughts of the era, dramatic strings, leaden drumbeats and special sonic effects build
tension. Shots of starving children, disseminated worldwide since the 1990s, appear, as do South
Korean newspaper headlines. Inset shots of the panelists’ expressions emphasize the similar response of
those from both North and South; host Nam adds occasional narration. The message is clear: the famine,
though having taken place in the North, should be regarded as a tragedy for the entire Korean minjok
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Figure 4: A segment on the Arduous
March. The caption reads "People who
were helpless to avoid starvation as the
100% state distribution system collapsed."
(“race” or “people”).
Although the emotional manipulations are palpable,
they fall readily within local traditions of melodrama
and are not merely expected but even perhaps desired;
rather more troubling is a cavalier attitude towards
documentary accuracy in the montage: the footage of
one woman in the piece comes from the end of the
2000s,22 suggesting that the show’s producers were
more concerned with images of suffering in the DPRK
than historical veracity. Hackneyed shots of goose-
stepping soldiers are included as well, carrying with
them the implicit subtext that the decisions of an
uncaring regime to prioritize military needs extended
the scale of disaster. As the montage ends, a caption
“nunsiuri bulgeojin talbuk minyeodeul” (“the reddened
eyes of refugee beauties”) drives home the cruelty of
visiting human-created catastrophe upon the innocent,
who also happen to be—lest the viewer has forgotten—
attractive young women, while the studio camera pans
to shots of the talbukja panelists composing themselves as the film clips fade. The video returns to
discussion of the Arduous March period through the memories of the panelists, and does not stint on a
continued backdrop of sentimental music to tug at viewer heartstrings. The show takes advantage of
personal tales of food deprivation and malnutrition to render the suffering viscerally affecting; Jo hangs
his head in dismay when he hears from a panelist that of the forty children in her school class, fully
fifteen could not attend school because of hunger.
Now on Our Way to Meet Who?
The inherent contradictions in the core characteristics of Imangap become perhaps most evident when
one examines the strategies used for the final minutes of each episode. For the most part, the culmination
has been marked by a talbuk seuteori (“defection story”), and even though they are presented in
manipulative fashion, it would require a heartless viewer indeed not to be moved by these powerful
narratives. In a recent paper, however, Oh (2013: 319) brings together a focus group of talbukja to
discuss their perceptions of how border-crossers are presented in South Korean media, and their
discussion of Imangap in particular suggests that the show is a target for substantial criticism among the
defector community precisely for how it portrays them as objects of pity. Many of Oh’s interviewees
feel that Now on My Way to Meet You willfully, if not maliciously, misrepresents them: “If [South
Koreans] see that, they’ll likely say that the women left North Korea because they couldn’t live there,
couldn’t adapt [to the changes in North Korean society]” one interviewee comments. “It’d be good to go
to Channel-A and ask them to stop the show. Too many lies,” adds another. Indeed, dominant media
representations of North Koreans in South Korea fail to acknowledge that a substantial percentage of
border-crossers actively select both the time and place of their departure from North Korea, and that they
do so to meet specific life goals, such as obtaining education in South Korea, and utilize the human
capital they have available to access opportunity in China and South Korea (Kim 2013).
Many recent episodes of Imangap, however, have taken a different approach to the final moments of the
show and bring before the audience narratives of talbuk seonggong (“refugee success”) rather than the
typically heart-rending tales that focus on the process of flight from North Korea itself. Regardless of
whether the show’s producers have been consciously responding to criticism from South Korean
academics and the media, talbuk seonggong narratives patently do return agency to defectors instead of
painting them as downtrodden victims. In this section a regular panelist, or, more frequently, a third
party, explains what she (or even, occasionally, he) has achieved since arriving in South Korea, and
how. For example, Episode 41 introduces a woman who owns and operates a Korean restaurant with a
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menu of 160 dishes, and Episode 46 presents another who, driven by the desire to provide her young
daughter with a better life, worked night and day to build up a micro-empire of convenience stores.23
To conclude our analysis of the show, let us juxtapose
these divergent concluding strategies, one in which
defection is marked by desperation, suffering and a lack
of the exercise of free will, and the other in which it
encompasses successful transition to neo-liberal
subjectivity and acquisition of economic benefits in
South Korea. The lurching between the two poles
highlights the broader uncertainties that underpin
Imangap.
The talbuk seuteori of Lee Sun-sil in Episode 28 is anomalous for a variety of reasons.24 Lee is older
(and considerably heavier) than the typical minyeo panelist; importantly, too, she hails from Pyongyang.
Refugees rarely come from the North Korean capital, and those that do find themselves viewed with
suspicion within their community, facing assumptions that that they must have done something wrong
that made them feel a need to escape the showpiece capital (Green and Park 2012).
The incongruity in Lee’s defection story is highlighted
by the opening question from one host, who asks why
she chose to defect given that she had been living a
comparatively comfortable life, doing work for the
Korean People’s Army that was not onerous, and was
blessed with good chulsin seongbun, the system
through which the perceived loyalty of a North Korean
citizen to the regime is classified. Lee answers that the
money she earned from her daily work with the military
had become insufficient to buy even a kilo of rice on
the open market. Furthermore, she suffered from domestic violence at the hands of her husband. As a
result of the growing divergence between market prices and her income, Lee and her younger sibling
were driven slowly into poverty and, ultimately, forced to embark on a beggar’s life (kkotjebi
saenghwal). Upon mention of how Lee turned to begging for survival, the show’s producers raise the
level of emotional intensity, bringing in piano accompaniment as she comments that everybody in North
Korea, from children to the elderly, will have experienced kkotjebi saenghwal at some point in their life.
An on-screen caption, “eorinaibuteo noinkkaji haruachime kkotjebiga doeneun sinse” (“hard life where
anyone from young to old can become a beggar in an instant”), reinforces the hyperbolic point.
The high emotional tenor of the narrative, which is packed with tragic events, continues as Lee reveals
how she had to give birth on the street near a train station in a Ryanggang Province border city.
Moreover, she claims to have been forcibly repatriated no fewer than nine times, a point highlighted in
the titling of this segment, “Lee Sun-sil, Nine Times Repatriated” (“ahop beon bukseong doen isunsil”).
On each occasion, she notes, she faced torture at the hands of the DPRK’s security apparatus and
speaks of the beatings she received in detail, noting how her child wept as it was forced to watch these
wrenching scenes.  Menacing sound effects are added, and periodic cutaways engage empathy for the
pathos of her narrative: the horror of the hosts, the pensive, downcast expression of her South Korean
husband in the audience, and abundant tears and the shock on the faces of her fellow panelists all
suggest that her story is unusually distressing, even for those who have fled North Korea.
Lee explains how she was eventually able to cross into China for good. Sharp intakes of breath from
others in the studio audience, however, elevated in the mix, greet the news that she immediately fell
victim to human traffickers, and was deceived into selling her child for a trivial sum. The narrative then
moves to South Korea, whereupon Lee attempts to convey the ongoing nightmare that her life has
become as a result of her experience of defection, repatriation, torture and the loss of her child in China.
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Figure 5: Presentation of a gift to an absent
loved one. The caption reads "A box of rice
cakes filled with yearning for a daughter."
She states that her pains are not hers alone, claiming that 80% of defectors also live with similar
psychological hardship.
Lee’s account climaxes, as do other examples of talbuk seuteori, with the display of a “gift” for an
absent loved one. Regardless of whether the women choose the items on their own or are guided to an
appropriate concept by the show’s producers, the embodiment of longing for missing family members in
a physical object inevitably provokes moments of high emotion, and when Lee displays the intended gift
of a mother and child teddy bear pair, there is scarcely a dry eye to be seen in anyone present in the
studio. The display of the gift also cements a narrative moral framework. 25 In Lee’s case, the point is
that mothers belong with their children come what may, but division has rendered this natural state of
affairs impossible. At this point Lee turns away from the host and directly to the camera and
apostrophizes her absent daughter, underscored by subtitles that follow her words and make an explicit
connection between her incompleteness and that of the nation:  “I miss you. I want to see you wherever
you are. Like the heart of your mother who longs for unification to happen soon, please wait for
unification and your mother. I love you.” In this respect, talbuk seuteori share similarities with the
narratives in Geu sarami bogo sipda, each of which can be read at the level of national allegory. At a
more personal level, however, narratives in Geu sarami bogo sipda are characterized by more
ambiguous and abstract senses of separation, in that many people are trying to reconstruct dim memories
of how they came to be separated from other family members. In Imangap separation is recent and
sharp, the grief often searingly fresh.  
The presentation of talbuk seonggong narratives also
follows a regular pattern; however, the formula differs
markedly from that of the defection stories. Rather than
sitting in a panelist’s chair, the protagonist of the
success story stands at a lectern, which is placed apart
on the stage, as in a formal talk or a university
classroom. Cameras are also positioned differently: for
the success story, the main angle is from below and
enhances the speaker’s authority, whereas in coming
from above in the tale of defection and looking down
upon the speaker, camera angles intimate
powerlessness. Talbuk seonggong stories rarely speak
of the time spent in North Korea, whereas a talbuk
seuteori is about little else. Instead of a gift for a
missing loved one, those who deliver talbuk seonggong
narratives, if they display an object at all, show one that
represents their bigyeol (“secret to success”). For
example, one successful woman reveals that she has hundreds of bank accounts, the better to build her
savings, and presents her many bankbooks as evidence.
The tale of Kim Su-jin in Episode 46 offers a representative example of talbuk seonggong. Kim explains
her desire to appear on the show as she begins to speak: her goal is to convey a sense of resilience and
empowerment to her fellow refugees from the North, giving them evidence that even ordinary people
like herself can succeed if they try (“hamyeon doelsu itda”). Nonetheless, she says nothing about her
former life in North Korea or her defection process. Rather, she focuses solely on her arrival in South
Korea with very little, and her subsequent step-by-step building of a profitable convenience store
business. She relates how after she left Hanawon, the state-run resettlement training center for North
Korean defectors, she received a government-allotted apartment from the South Korean government, as
do other refugees, and then worked at her first job as a gas station attendant for three months. During
this period she claims that both she and her young daughter felt content. However, a problem arose in
that whenever her child visited a friend’s home, she would return to ask why her home only had a
couple of rooms and her family didn’t own a car. Perturbed that this state of affairs suggested that she
was not fulfilling her duties as a mother properly, Kim soon persuaded the owner of a small
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convenience store to let her manage the establishment, and has since gone on to operate a string of
similar stores.
Although one may quarrel with the message that status and wealth, as measured by large apartments and
private cars, mark out the boundaries of “success” in South Korea, this partial rechanneling of the
show’s energies has led it to broadcast interpretations of resettlement in South Korea that highlight
personal triumph rather than trauma. The shift represents a rejoinder to many of the critiques cited earlier
in Oh (2013). These new elements in the show are now presenting a vision of how the integration of
that community into South Korean society might be achieved.
Conclusion
Imangap has yet to escape controversy. Given heavy-handed government media initiatives promoting a
limited vision of immigrant integration and South Korean multiculturalism, active Ministry of
Unification support for the production of Imangap and other shows concerning North Korea hardly
inspires confidence that a balanced portrayal of North Korean people, including those who have made
their way across the border, will result. Moreover, in South Korea’s polarized political and media
climate, shows about North Korea-related topics unavoidably risk distrust. Imangap is broadcast under
the auspices of the staunchly conservative Dong-A media conglomerate, and criticism of the show has
been launched by Hankyoreh, the standard-bearer of the left, for converting North Korean reality into
entertainment (Choe 2012). Certainly, the daily Dong-A Ilbo, and its ideological brethren, the Chosun
Ilbo and Joongang Ilbo, are drawn to material about talbukja: tales about refugees suggest not merely
compassion for a struggling minority, but awareness that details of cruelty and hardship in North Korea
buttress a historical anti-communism. The ongoing repetition of these details has experienced a
noteworthy recrudescence in such everyday practices as television consumption since the demise of the
Sunshine Policy. This phenomenon reminds us of the functioning of banal examples of collective
identity formation (Billig 1995) in South Korea that rely upon North Korea as an Other against which
visions of the nation can take shape, even as its demographics evolve.  
Our analysis of segments from the show partially reinforces concerns about a lack of balance in
representation: Imangap plays up the namnam bungnyeo trope, depicts North Korea alternately as a
quaint backwater and a ruthless dictatorship, and seeks to arouse sympathy for the people of North
Korea even at the expense of accuracy. For these reasons, among others, some talbukja, including a
former panelist interviewed by one of the co-authors, feel that the show ought to leave the 1990s and
early 2000s in particular where they are: times of great hardship in North Korea, but bearing little
relation to what occurs today. The informant avoids appearing on the show now, citing concerns over
the image of defectors and the defection process that it fosters. And yet, as the juxtaposition of talbuk
seuteori and talbuk seonggong suggests, it is equally possible for Imangap to give more balanced,
nuanced and non-judgmental portrayals of North Koreans. The show has proven that it does not
inherently require that defectors be portrayed as downtrodden victims, the better to emphasize the evils
of the North Korean government.
In short, Imangap evinces palpably schizophrenic attitudes. On one hand, it clearly wishes to highlight a
dongjilseong (homogeneity) of the peoples of the two Koreas. In contrast to Misuda, its presentation of
its panelists as intriguingly exotic objects of desire can also draw on imaginations (and displays) of
linguistic, cultural and genetic commonality to foster closeness. In similar fashion, the show tries to offer
a special place for North Korean border-crossers in the face of South Korea’s newfound
multiculturalism and to suggest that the common heritage of the past may allow for a common future
should reunification eventuate. Like such programs as Love in Asia, then, Now on My Way to Meet You
contributes to developing a discourse of diversity that both acknowledges and supports changes in the
fabric of South Korean society during the second decade of the 21st century. An essential difference,
however, lies in the ability of Imangap to call upon sites of shared cultural memory as glue for binding
North Korean migrants more tightly to the host community. In this sense, the show’s exposition suggests
a belief that tales of trauma can push the nation toward catharsis in the spirit of Geu sarami bogo sipda.
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Nonetheless, by insistently returning to points of enormous difference in order to make the women’s
stories attention-getting and render the show compelling, Imangap reminds its viewers that a genuine
appreciation of the experience of talbukja will remain beyond their grasp. This strategy intersects with
the namnam bungnyeo trope to, quite literally, engender a hierarchical Othering (tajahwa) that
emphasizes the yawning gap that remains between North and South and encode it as a difference
between a strong masculine nation seeking to play the role of protector and its weak feminine
counterpart. The two overarching approaches are scarcely compatible.
This schizophrenia is not merely a product of media manipulation, although such manipulation is a
concern. Rather, it points to deeper societal quandaries. In the last 15 years, South Korea experienced a
decade of the Sunshine Policy, under which previously unimaginable depictions of North Korea and
North Koreans emerged. More recently, the country lived out five years of rigidly conservative
government, with the prospect of five more under the current administration. This latter era has seen a
return to suspicion of North Korean motivations at the highest levels of South Korean government, and
with just cause; Pyongyang has frittered away much of the lingering sympathy it retained in South
Korean society through repeated provocations. Recent spy films including 2012’s Gancheop (The Spy)
and 2013’s record-breaking Eunmilhage, Widaehage (Secretly, Greatly) suggest that although the
national imaginary continues to wish for the possibility of identification with Northerners as individuals,
consciousness of the North as threat has made a significant return.
Ultimately, fluctuations in media images of North Koreans have not brought South Korea closer to
coming to terms with its internal social divisions, much less the division with its northern neighbor. The
inability of Imangap to convey a unitary approach toward North Korea is a reflection of not just
contestation but confusion and ambivalence in South Korean society. The Sunshine Policy may have
opened up new vistas for screen representations of North Koreans in South Korea, but it did not answer
a more serious question: in the twenty-first century, following several decades of historical divergence
and with distance increasing year by year, does South Korea as a whole truly desire reunification with
its troubled neighbor, or would it rather relegate it to the status of another country altogether?
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Notes
1 A version of this article was presented at the ‘Years of Radical Change’ conference held at the
University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies on May 31 and June 1, 2013. We would
like to thank the audience at that venue for helpful remarks. Andray Abrahamian, Suzy Kim, and the
referees of this journal have also provided us with insightful comments. Our research has been
supported by a grant from the Royal Marsden Society of New Zealand. 
2 In this article we use talkbukja in preference to saeteomin (“new settlers”) for the sake of consistency
rather than to make a political statement about terminology that is often fraught. Although talbukja is no
longer the officially sanctioned designation, it is the term most frequently used in everyday discourse.
Conversely, for the sake of variation in English and to suit context, we have been less strict in switching
between “refugee”, “border-crosser” and “defector.”
3As producer Lee Jin-min stated in a June 2012 interview with the Los Angeles Times, “The defectors
say that they feel anonymous, like a seed of grain dropped from the sky in a foreign place when they
first arrive in South Korea. Hearing the stories from such people makes it more personal and can call
attention to the fact that war and separation is an ongoing issue” (Choi 2012).
4 See further the Ministry of Unification’s website.
5 The Ministry of Unification’s acknowledgement of Channel-A’s work in highlighting defector issues
and its intention to support that work underscores the close relations between the show and the South
Korean authorities. See “Tongilbu, tongil-nambukgwangye gwannyeon eollonindeul-ege gamsa-ui
maeumeul jeonhada” [Ministry of Unification conveys thanks to media figures involved with unification
and inter-Korean issues], Ministry of Unification press release, November 14, 2012.
6 Controversy over the broadcasting standards that Channel-A and TV Chosun apply in reporting on
North Korea arose again in May 2013, when both networks gave extended airtime to the claim that
North Korean commandos had entered Gwangju in 1980 to incite the 5.18 democratization protests by,
among other things, shooting local civilians. South Korea’s Communication Standards Commission
forced both to apologize for inaccurate reporting (Lee 2013). For more, see Green and Denney
(forthcoming).
7 “Round-table Talks Held with Inhabitants of DPRK upon Their Return Home from South,” Rodong
Sinmun (online), May 20, 2013.
8 Defection broker Kim Yong-hwa corroborated the defection story on September 15, 2013. However,
only a Dong-A Ilbo story on the subject has thus far included mention of Imangap; it has not been
independently confirmed. For the original story, see “Buk bowigigwan gowijik ttal talbukhu
hangukhaeng” [Daughter of high-level DPRK security agency official South Korea-bound after
defection], Dong-A Ilbo, September 16, 2013.
9 “Jeryu oegugin 150-man myeong cheot dolpa…damunhwa-dainjonghwa gasok” [Resident foreigner
numbers break through 1.5 million for first time… multicultural and multiethnic society accelerates],
Yonhap News (online), June 10, 2013.
11 Indeed, Channel-A itself has referred to the show explicitly as “talbuk-ui minyeodeul-ui suda.” See
0:51 of this video, which excerpts the network’s program Jamgeum Haejae 2020 (Unlock 2020).
12 Imangap has recently added segments in which North Korean non-panelist guests appear on the
show and seek help in searching for family members they have been separated from in the process of
coming to South Korea, thus rendering the connection to Geu sarami bogo sipda much more explicit.
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13 Virtually every episode supports our arguments equally well, but access for most requires a
subscription to Channel-A. We have created a YouTube playlist for Episode 45 as well as other
segments discussed in this article, which is available here. The clips, it should be noted, are not subtitled.
14 Shin’s “fan café,” which is shared with her sister Shin Eun-hui, can be found here.
15 See Kim, So-yeol, “Potatoes at the End of the Earth”, Daily NK (online). April 9, 2012.
16 See here.
17 See here.
18 See here.
19 See, e.g., “Seoul’s Defector Girl Boxer Stars in Rare Triumph for Refugees,” an article published by
Bloomberg in June 2013 that mirrors the usual treatment of refugee success; domestic South Korean
media offer a similar approach.
20 Episode 34, e.g., focuses on sports, as the title Bukhan eun seupocheu ui modeun geot (“All about
North Korean Sports”) conveys. See here.
21 These performances also usually involve impressive demonstrations of musical talent on the part of
the talbukjaparticipants. Episode 33, for example, includes an excellent accordion rendition
of Yeoseongeun kkochirane (“Women Are Flowers”), an alleged favorite of Kim Jong-un, while in
Episode 54 one of the regular panelists offers a note-perfect version of Gaseumui pumeun
sarang (“Heart Full of Love”), the theme song to the 2003 South Korean movie Seontaek (The Road
Taken).
22 Kang, Won-cheol, “Destitute TV Girl Finally Died of Starvation,” Daily NK (online), December 9,
2012.
23 For this latter clip, see here. Instances can be considerably multiplied: Episode 47 introduces a
mathematics teacher who, increasingly unable to tolerate the non-meritocratic nature of North Korea
society, escaped and went on to establish an ‘alternative school’ in the South for refugee children. Dr.
Lee Ae-ran relates in Episode 50 how she became the first female North Korean refugee to obtain a
doctorate from a South Korean university, while in Episode 54 Kim Yu-seong, father of Kim Jang-ok,
one of the regular participants, explains his successful mushroom export business. 
24 Lee Sun-sil’s defection story is available here.
25 Rather differently, the rice cake gift that accompanies the talbuk seuteori of Choi Geum-sil in
Episode 45, conveys the message that South Korea is a land of capitalist milk and honey, where such
items can be had for as little as 1,000 won, although in North Korea such things are often unobtainable.
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